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Abstract. In this paper we study input/output STIT logic. We introduce the se-
mantics, proof theory and prove the completeness theorem. Input/output STIT
logic has more expressive power than Makinson and van der Torre’s input/output
logic. We show that input/output STIT logic is decidable and free from Ross’
paradox.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, normative multi-agent system [7, 2] arises as a new interdisciplinary
academic area bringing together researchers from multi-agent system [22], deontic logic
[9] and normative system [1, 10]. Norms play an important role in normative multi-
agent system. They are heavily used in agent cooperation and coordination, group de-
cision making, multi-agent organizations, electronic institutions, and so on.
In the first volume of the handbook of deontic logic and normative systems [9],
input/output logic [14–17] appears as one of the new achievement in deontic logic
in recent years. Input/output logic takes its origin in the study of conditional norms.
Unlike the modal logic framework, which usually uses possible world semantics, in-
put/output logic adopts mainly operational semantics: a normative system is conceived
in input/output logic as a deductive machine, like a black box which produces normative
statements as output, when we feed it descriptive statements as input.
Boella and van der Torre [6] extends input/output logic to reasoning about constitu-
tive norms. Tosatto et al. [8] adapts it to represent and reason about abstract normative
systems. For a comprehensive introduction to input/output logic, see Parent and van der
Torre [17]. A technical toolbox to build input/output logic is developed in Sun [21].
One limitation of Makinson and van der Torre’s input/output logic is that it uses
propositional logic as its base logic. Such treatment restricts its expressive power. For
example, concepts such as agent, action and ability which are crucial for agent theory
and multi-agent system, are unable to be expressed in input/output logic. To overcome
this limitation, we need a more expressive logic to be the base of input/output logic.
STIT theory or STIT logic [5], is one of the most prominent accounts of agency
in philosophy of action. It is the logic of constructions of the form “agent i sees to it
that φ holds”. STIT logic has strong expressive power. Notions like agent, action and
ability can be expressed in STIT logic. Therefore STIT logic is an ideal candidate to
build new input/output logic. But there are various STIT logic: individual STIT and
group STIT, achieve STIT and deliberative STIT. In this paper we choose individual
deliberative STIT logic as the basis to develop input/output logic. We make this choice
for the following reasons:
1. Compared to Makinson and van der Torre’s input/output logic, this input/output
STIT logic has more expressive power.
2. Choosing individual STIT makes our logic decidable, while if we choose group
STIT we lose decidability.
3. By choosing deliberative STIT, our logic is free from a well known paradox, Ross’
paradox, which is a challenge for lots of deontic logic, including Makinson and
van der Torre’s input/output logic. If we choose achieve STIT, we are not free from
Ross’ paradox.
The structure of this paper is as follows: we recap some background knowledge,
including some basic concepts and results of STIT logic, in the Section 2. Then in
Section 3 and 4 we study the proof theory, semantics, completeness and decidability of
input/output STIT logic. We show that input/output STIT logic solves Ross’ paradox
in Section 5. We discuss research avenues for future work and conclude this paper in
Section 6.
2 Background
Given a countable set P of propositional letters and a finite set Agt of agents, the lan-
guage of individual STIT logic L is defined by the following BNF: for every p ∈ P and
i ∈ Agt,
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | [id]ϕ | ϕ
Intuitively [id]ϕ is read as “agent i deliberately sees to it that ϕ” , ϕ is read as “neces-
sary ϕ”. We use [i]ϕ, read as “agent i successfully sees to it that ϕ”, as an abbreviation
of [id]ϕ ∨ϕ. We use ♦ϕ to represent ¬¬ϕ.
In the literature [id] is called “deliberative STIT” and [i] is called “achieve STIT”
(or Chellas’ STIT). Intuitively, [i]ϕ simply means i sees to it that ϕ holds, while [id]ϕ
means i not only sees to it that ϕ holds, but also ϕ can be false without the action of
i. Deliberative STIT and achieve STIT are inter-definable because [i]φ is equivalent to
[id]ϕ ∨ ϕ, while [id]φ is equivalent to [i]ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ. We will introduce the semantics
and axiomatic system via achieve STIT, and build our input/output logic on deliberative
STIT.
In STIT logic, actions are expressed as relations between agents and effects: [i]φ is
an action which means “agent i ensures the world is among those satisfying φ”. Agent’s
ability is expressed by ♦[i]ϕ meaning that agent i has the ability to ensure the world is
among those satisfying φ.
The semantics of STIT logic is originally defined by the branching-time choice
structure. A simpler possible world semantics for group STIT is proposed by Kooi and
Tamminga [13]. Here we simplify it for individual STIT.
Definition 1 (Possible world semantics). A model is a tuple M = (W,Choice, V ),
where
1. W is a nonempty set of possible worlds,
2. V : P 7→ 2W is the valuation for propositional letters.
3. Choice is a choice function which satisfies the following conditions:
(a) for every i ∈ Agt it holds that Choice(i) is a partition of W ;
(b) for Agt = {1, ..., n}, for every x1 ∈ Choice(1), . . . , xn ∈ Choice(n), x1 ∩
. . . ∩ xn 6= ∅;
Let Ri be the equivalence relation induced by Choice(i). That is, (w,w′) ∈ Ri iff
there isK ∈ Choice(i) such that {w,w′} ⊆ K. Given a modelM and a worldw ∈M ,
formulas of L is evaluated as follows:
– M,w |= p iff w ∈ V (p) for all p ∈ P.
– M,w |= ¬ϕ iff not M,w |= ϕ.
– M,w |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M,w |= ϕ and M,w |= ψ.
– M,w |= ϕ iff M,w′ |= ϕ for all w′ ∈W .
– M,w |= [i]ϕ iff M,w′ |= ϕ for all w′ such that (w,w′) ∈ Ri.
A formula φ ∈ L is valid iff for all model M and all w ∈ M , if M,w |= φ. φ
is satisfiable iff there are some model M and some w ∈ M such that M,w |= φ. φ
is a logical consequence of a set of formulas Φ if for all model M and all w ∈ M , if
M,w |= ψ for all ψ ∈ Φ, then M,w |= φ. The individual STIT logic is axiomatized by
the following axioms [5, 4]:
1. all instances of propositional tautologies
2. the axiom schemas of S5 for 
3. the axiom schemas of S5 for every [i]
4. ϕ→ [i]ϕ
5. (♦[0]ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ♦[k]ϕk)→ ♦([0]ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ [k]ϕk)
The derivation rules of STIT logic is modus ponens and necessitation for . A formula
ϕ is a derivable (` ϕ) iff it is derivable via the above axiomatic system. We use ψ ` ϕ
to represent ` ψ → ϕ.
Theorem 1 ([5]). For every φ ∈ L, |= φ iff ` φ.
The satisfiability problem of individual STIT logic is the following decision prob-
lem: given a formula φ, is φ satisfiable? Balbiani et al [4] show that this problem is
solvable in exponential time by a non-deterministic Turing machine.
Theorem 2 ([4]). The complexity of the satisfiability problem of individual STIT logic
is in NEXPTIME.
3 Input/output STIT logic
Input/output logic adopts mainly operational semantics. The procedure of operational
semantics is divided into three stages. In the first stage, we have in hand a set of propo-
sitions (call it the input) as a description of the current state. We then apply logical
operators to this set, say close the set by logical consequence. Then we pass this set to
a deductive machine and we reach the second stage. In the second stage, the machine
accepts the input and produces a set of propositions as output. In the third stage, we
accept the output and apply logical operators to it. A more formal explanation relies on
the following terminologies.
A normative system N ⊆ L × L is a set of ordered pairs of formulas. A pair
(φ, ψ) ∈ N , call it a norm, is read as “given φ, it ought to be ψ”. N is viewed as
a function (or a deductive machine) from 2L to 2L such that for a set Φ of formulas,
N(Φ) = {ψ | (φ, ψ) ∈ N for some φ ∈ Φ}. Let Cn(Φ) = {φ ∈ L : Φ |= φ}.
3.1 Simple-minded
Definition 2 (Simple-minded output). Given a set of norms N ⊆ L × L and a set of
formulas Φ ⊆ L,
O1(N,Φ) = Cn(N(Cn(Φ))).
The idea behind simple-minded input/output STIT logic O1 is: we first take a set of
formulas representing facts, then we close it under logical consequence. We further pass
this closed set to the deductive machine (i.e. the normative system). The deductive ma-
chine produces a set of formulas representing obligations. We finally close obligations
under logical consequence.
Example 1. Suppose a, b, x, y are propositional letters, i, j are agents. LetN = {(a, [i]x),
(a, [j]y), (b, x ∧ y)}. Then O1(N, {a}) = Cn(N(Cn({a}))) = Cn({[i]x, [j]y}). 
On the proof-theoretical side, input/output STIT logics are characterized by deriva-
tion rules about norms. Given a set of norms N , a derivation system is the smallest set
of norms which extends N and is closed under certain derivation rules. The following
are the rules we will use:
– SI (strengthening the input): from (φ1, ψ) to (φ2, ψ) whenever |= φ2 → φ1
– WO (weakening the output): from (φ, ψ1) to (φ, ψ2) whenever |= ψ1 → ψ2
– AND (conjunction of the output): from (φ, ψ1) and (φ, ψ2) to (φ, ψ1 ∧ ψ2)
– OR (disjunction of the input): from (φ1, ψ) and (φ2, ψ) to (φ1 ∨ φ2, ψ)
– CT (cumulative transitivity): from (φ, ψ1) and (φ ∧ ψ1, ψ2) to (φ, ψ2)
The derivation system of simple-minded input/output STIT logic,D1(N), is decided by
the rules SI, WO and AND. Adding OR to D1(N) gives D2(N), the derivation system
of basic input/output STIT logic. Adding CT to D1(N) gives D3(N), the derivation
system of simple-minded reusable input/output STIT logic. All the five rules together
gives the derivation system of basic reusable input/output STIT logic.
Example 2. Suppose a, b, x, y are propositional letters, i, j are agents. Let N = {(a ∨
b, [j]x)}, then ([i]b, [j](x ∨ y)) ∈ D1(N) because we have the following derivation
1. (a ∨ b, [j]x) Assumption
2. ([i]b, [j]x) 1, SI
3. ([i]b, [j](x ∨ y)) 2, WO
Theorem 3. Given N ⊆ L× L, ψ ∈ O1(N, {φ}) iff (φ, ψ) ∈ D1(N).
Proof. Using technics from Sun [20], the proof is routine and here we omit it. a
3.2 Basic
Simple-minded outputO1 is unable to process disjunctive input intelligently: from input
Φ = {φ1 ∨ φ2} and normative system N = {(φ1, ψ), (φ2, ψ)} we don’t have ψ ∈
O1(N,Φ). Basic output O2 strengthens O1 to make up for such deficiency.
Definition 3 (Basic output). Given a set of norms N ⊆ L × L and a set of formulas
Φ ⊆ L,
O2(N,Φ) =
⋂
{Cn(N(Cn(Ψ))) : Φ ⊆ Ψ, Ψ is disjunctive}.
Here a set Ψ is disjunctive if for all φ ∨ ψ ∈ Ψ , either φ ∈ Ψ or ψ ∈ Ψ .
It can be verified that from input Φ = {φ1 ∨ φ2} and normative system N =
{(φ1, ψ), (φ2, ψ)}we have ψ ∈ O2(N,Φ). The following completeness theorem shows
that O2 corresponds to the derivation system D2 where the rule disjunction of the input
is involved.
Theorem 4. Given N ⊆ L× L, ψ ∈ O2(N, {φ}) iff (φ, ψ) ∈ D2(N).
Proof. (⇒) Assume (φ, ψ) ∈ D2(N), we prove by induction on the length of deriva-
tion.
Base step: assume (φ, ψ) ∈ N . Thenψ ∈ N({φ}) ⊆ N(Cn(φ)) ⊆ ⋂{N(Cn(Ψ)) :
φ ∈ Ψ, Ψ is disjunctive}⊆ ⋂{Cn(N(Cn(Ψ))) : φ ∈ Ψ, Ψ is disjunctive} = O2(N, {φ}).
Inductive step: here we only prove the case (φ, ψ) is derived by the OR rule in
the last step of derivation. Other cases are easier. Assume there are (φ1, ψ) ∈ D2(N),
(φ2, ψ) ∈ D2(N) and φ is φ1 ∨ φ2. By induction hypothesis we know ψ ∈ O2(N,φ1)
and ψ ∈ O2(N,φ2). Now for every set of formulas E such that φ ∈ E and E is
disjunctive, we have φ1 ∨ φ2 ∈ E since φ is φ1 ∨ φ2. Note that E is disjunctive,
so we further have either φ1 ∈ E or φ2 ∈ E. If φ1 ∈ E, then E is a disjunctive
set contains φ1. So we have ψ ∈ O2(N,φ1) =
⋂{Cn(N(Cn(B)) : φ1 ∈ B,B is
disjunctive} ⊆ Cn(N(Cn(E))). Hence ψ ∈ Cn(N(Cn(E))). If φ2 ∈ E, we can
similarly deduce ψ ∈ Cn(N(Cn(E))). Therefore no matter φ1 ∈ E or φ2 ∈ E, we
have ψ ∈ Cn(N(Cn(E))). Therefore ψ ∈ O2(N,φ).
(⇐)Assumeψ ∈ O2(N,φ), thenψ ∈
⋂{Cn(N(Cn(B)) : φ ∈ B,B is disjunctive}.
Let {B1, . . . , Bn} be the set of all minimal disjunctive extensions of {φ}. Therefore we
have ψ ∈ Cn(N(Cn(Bi))) for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
EachBi corresponds to a branch of the disjunctive parsing tree, defined in Definition
4, of φ. Note that formulas in Bi can be strictly ordered by their length. Let φi be the
shortest formula of Bi. Then for each χ ∈ Bi, |= φi → χ.
Then we know ψ ∈ Cn(N(Cn(φi))). Hence there are ψi1, . . . , ψik ∈ N(Cn(φi))
such that ψi1 ∧ . . .∧ψik |= ψ. Then by SI we know (φi, ψi1), . . . , (φi, ψik) ∈ D2(N).
Then by AND and WO we know (φi, ψ) ∈ D2(N). Now by Lemma 2 we know
(φ, ψ) ∈ D2(N). a
Definition 4 (disjunctive parsing tree). Given a formula φ ∈ L, the disjunctive pars-
ing tree P (φ) is a tree such that:
(a) φ is the root of P (φ).
(b) Every node which is not a leaf has arity 2.
(c) A node ψ has daughters ψ1 and ψ2 iff ψ is ψ1 ∨ ψ2.
(d) We define the height for each node as follows: every leaf has height 0. If µ is a node
with daughters ν1, ν2, then the height of µ is max{height(ν1), height(ν2)}+ 1.
Lemma 1. For every formula φ, every branch of P (φ) is a disjunctive set.
Proof. Let B be an arbitrary branch of P (φ). For every φ1 ∨ φ2 ∈ B, we know φ1 and
φ2 are the only daughters of φ1 ∨φ2. Therefore B contains either φ1 or φ2. Hence B is
disjunctive. a
Lemma 2. Let (φ, ψ) be a norm and N a normative system. If for every Bi which is a
branch of P (φ), there exist φi ∈ Bi such that (φi, ψ) ∈ N , then (φ, ψ) ∈ D2(N).
Proof. Since the length of φ is always finite, we know P (φ) is also finite. So we assume
{B1, . . . , Bn} is the set of all branches of P (φ).
Here we just consider the worst case, other cases are easier. In the worst case we
have for every Bi, the element φi ∈ Bi such that (φi, ψ) ∈ N is of height 0. Then
by applying the OR rule finitely many times we know that for every φ′i ∈ Bi with
height(φ′i) = 1, (φ
′
i, ψ) ∈ D2(N). Similarly we can deduce that for every φ′′i ∈ Bi
with height(φ′′i ) = 2, (φ
′′
i , ψ) ∈ D2(N). This progress can go on and on and we will
eventually have (φ, ψ) ∈ D2(N) since the height of φ is finite. a
3.3 Simple-minded reusable
In certain situations, it may be appropriate for outputs to be available for recycling as
inputs. On the syntactic level, such a principle of reusability is expressed by the rule
CT. On the semantic level, we define simple-minded reusable output O3 to implement
reusability.
Definition 5 (Simple-minded reusable output). Given a set of normsN ⊆ L×L and
a set of formulas Φ ⊆ L, We define a function fNΦ : 2L → 2L such that fNΦ (X) =
Cn(Φ∪N(X)), for all X ∈ 2L. It can be proved that fNΦ is monotonic with respect to
the set theoretical ⊆ relation, and (2L,⊆) is a complete lattice. Then by Tarski’s fixed
point theorem there exist a least fixed point of fNΦ . Let B
N
Φ be the least fixed point of
fNΦ ,
O3(N,Φ) = Cn(N(B
N
Φ )).
We use BNφ as an abbreviation of B
N
{φ}. The following theorem shows that the
syntactic approach D3 and the semantics approach O3 coincide.
Theorem 5. Given N ⊆ L× L, ψ ∈ O3(N, {φ}) iff (φ, ψ) ∈ D3(N).
Proof. The proof mainly uses technics from Sun [20].
(⇐) Assume (φ, ψ) ∈ D3(N), then we prove by induction on the length of derivation.
– (Base step) Assume (φ, ψ) ∈ N , then by Lemma 4 we have φ ∈ BNφ . Hence
ψ ∈ N(BNφ ) ⊆ Cn(N(BNφ )).
– Assume (φ, ψ) ∈ D3(N) and it is derived by using SI from (χ, ψ) ∈ D3(N)
and |= φ → χ. Then by inductive hypothesis we have ψ ∈ Cn(N(BNχ )). By
Lemma 6 we know BNχ ⊆ BNφ . Therefore we further have N(BNχ ) ⊆ N(BNφ ),
Cn(N(BNχ )) ⊆ Cn(N(BNφ )). Hence ψ ∈ Cn(N(BNφ )).
– Assume (φ, ψ) ∈ D3(N), ψ is ψ1 ∧ ψ2 and it is derived by using AND from
(φ, ψ1) and (φ, ψ2). Then by inductive hypothesis we have ψ1 ∈ Cn(N(BNφ )) and
ψ2 ∈ Cn(N(BNφ )). Therefore ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∈ Cn(N(BNφ )).
– Assume (φ, ψ) ∈ D3(N) and it is derived by using WO from (φ, ψ1) ∈ D3(N)
and |= ψ1 → ψ. Then by inductive hypothesis we have ψ1 ∈ Cn(N(BNφ )). Since
|= ψ1 → ψ, we can prove that ψ ∈ Cn(N(BNφ )).
– Assume (φ, ψ) ∈ D3(N) and it is derived by using CT form (φ, ψ1) ∈ D3(N) and
(φ ∧ ψ1, ψ) ∈ D3(N). Then by inductive hypothesis we have ψ1 ∈ Cn(N(BNφ ))
and ψ ∈ Cn(N(BNφ∧ψ1)). Then by Lemma 8 we have BNφ = BNφ∧ψ1 . Therefore
ψ ∈ Cn(N(BNφ )).
(⇒) Assume ψ ∈ Cn(N(BNφ )), then there exist ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ N(BNφ ) such that
ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn |= ψ. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, from ψi ∈ N(BNφ ) we know there
is φi ∈ BNφ such that (φi, ψi) ∈ N . From φi ∈ BNφ we know there exist k such
that φi ∈ BNφ,k. Now by Lemma 9 we know (φ, ψi) ∈ D3(N). Then by applying
the AND rule we have (φ, ψ1 ∧ . . . ψn) ∈ D3(N). Then by the WO rule we have
(φ, ψ) ∈ D3(N). a
Lemma 3. BNΦ =
⋃∞
i=0B
N
Φ,i, where B
N
Φ,0 = Cn(Φ), B
N
Φ,i+1 = Cn(Φ ∪N(BNΦ,i)).
Proof. We first prove that
⋃∞
i=0B
N
Φ,i is a fixed point of f
N
Φ . We prove by showing the
following:
1. Φ ⊆ ⋃∞i=0BNΦ,i: this is because Φ ⊆ Cn(Φ) = BNΦ,0 ⊆ ⋃∞i=0BNΦ,i.
2. N(
⋃∞
i=0B
N
Φ,i) ⊆
⋃∞
i=0B
N
Φ,i: For every φ ∈ N(
⋃∞
i=0B
N
Φ,i), there exist k such that
φ ∈ N(BNΦ,k) ⊆ BNΦ,k+1 ⊆
⋃∞
i=0B
N
Φ,i.
3. Cn(
⋃∞
i=0B
N
Φ,i) =
⋃∞
i=0B
N
Φ,i: the right-to-left direction is obvious; for the other
direction: assume φ ∈ Cn(⋃∞i=0BNΦ,i), then there exist φ1, . . . φn ∈ ⋃∞i=0BNΦ,i
such that |= φ1∧ . . .∧φn → φ. Therefore there exist k such that φ1, . . . φn ∈ BNΦ,k.
Hence φ ∈ BNΦ,k+1 ⊆
⋃∞
i=0B
N
Φ,i.
With the above items in hand, we can prove that fNΦ (
⋃∞
i=0B
N
Φ,i) ⊆
⋃∞
i=0B
N
Φ,i. For the
other direction, we prove by induction on i that for every i, BNΦ,i ⊆ fNΦ (
⋃∞
i=0B
N
Φ,i).
Here we omit the details.
So we have proved that
⋃∞
i=0B
N
Φ,i is a fixed point of f
N
Φ . To prove that it is the least
fixed point, we can again prove by induction that for every i, BNΦ,i ⊆ fNΦ (B), where B
is a fixed point of fNΦ . Here we omit the details. a
Lemma 4. For every Φ ⊆ L, N ⊆ L× L, Φ ⊆ BNΦ .
Proof. By Lemma 3, the proof is trivial. a
Lemma 5. For every φ ∈ L, N ⊆ L× L, BNφ = Cn(BNφ ).
Proof. By Lemma 3, the proof is easy. a
Lemma 6. For every φ, ψ ∈ L, N ⊆ L× L, if |= φ→ ψ then BNψ ⊆ BNφ .
Proof. We will prove that for every i, BNψ,i ⊆ BNφ,i. We prove by induction on i.
If i = 0, then BNψ,0 = Cn(ψ) ⊆ Cn(φ) ⊆ BNφ,0. Assume i = k + 1 and
BNψ,k ⊆ BNφ,k. Then BNψ,k+1 = Cn({ψ} ∪ N(BNψ,k)). From BNψ,k ⊆ BNφ,k we de-
duce N(BNψ,k) ⊆ N(BNφ,k). Now by the monotony of Cn(•) we know Cn({ψ} ∪
N(BNψ,k)) ⊆ Cn({φ} ∪N(BNφ,k)). Hence BNψ,k+1 ⊆ BNφ,k+1.
So we have proved for every i, BNψ,i ⊆ BNφ,i. With this result in hand, we can easily
deduce that BNψ ⊆ BNφ . a
Lemma 7. If ψ ∈ Cn(N(BNφ )), then ψ ∈ BNφ .
Proof. By Lemma 3, it is easy to verify that N(BNφ ) ⊆ BNφ and Cn(BNφ ) ⊆ BNφ . The
result then follows.
Lemma 8. If ψ ∈ Cn(N(BNφ )), then BNφ = BNφ∧ψ .
Proof. It’s easy to prove that BNφ ⊆ BNφ∧ψ . For the other direction, we need to prove
that for every i, BNφ∧ψ,i ⊆ BNφ . We prove this by induction on i.
– Base step: Let i = 0, we then have BNφ∧ψ,i = Cn(φ ∧ ψ). By Lemma 4 we have
φ ∈ BNφ . By Lemma 7 we have ψ ∈ BNφ . Then by Lemma 5 we have φ∧ψ ∈ BNφ .
– Inductive step: Assume for i = k, BNφ∧ψ,k ⊆ BNφ . Then BNφ∧ψ,k+1 = Cn({φ ∧
ψ}∪N(BNφ∧ψ,k)). FromBNφ∧ψ,k ⊆ BNφ we know there exist j such thatBNφ∧ψ,k ⊆⋃j
i=0B
N
φ,i. Therefore N(B
N
φ∧ψ,k)) ⊆ N(
⋃j
i=0B
N
φ,i) ⊆
⋃j+1
i=0 B
N
φ,i ⊆ BNφ . So we
have proved N(BNφ∧ψ,k)) ⊆ BNφ . By the base step we have φ ∧ ψ ∈ BNφ . Then by
Lemma 5 we know Cn({φ∧ψ} ∪N(BNφ∧ψ,k)) ⊆ BNφ . That is, BNφ∧ψ,k+1 ⊆ BNφ .
Lemma 9. For all i, if χ ∈ BNφ,i and (χ, ψ) ∈ N , then (φ, ψ) ∈ D3(N)
Proof. We prove by induction on i.
– Base step: Let i = 0. Then χ ∈ BNφ,0 = Cn(φ). Hence |= φ → χ. Therefore we
can apply SI to |= φ→ χ and (χ, ψ) to derive (φ, ψ).
– Inductive step: Assume for i = k, if χ ∈ BNφ,k and (χ, ψ) ∈ N , then (φ, ψ) ∈
D3(N). Now let χ ∈ BNφ,k+1. Then χ ∈ Cn({φ} ∪ N(BNφ,k)), and there exist
χ1 . . . χn ∈ N(BNφ,k) such that φ∧χ1∧. . .∧χn |= χ. Then apply SI to (χ, ψ) ∈ N
and φ ∧ χ1 ∧ . . . ∧ χn |= χ we have (φ ∧ χ1 ∧ . . . ∧ χn, x) ∈ D3(N). Note that
for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, from χi ∈ N(BNφ,k) we know there is φi ∈ BNφ,k such
that (φi, χi) ∈ N . Now by inductive hypothesis we have (φ, χi) ∈ D3(N). Then
applying the AND rule we have (φ, χ1 ∧ . . . ∧ χn) ∈ D3(N). From (φ, χ1 ∧ . . . ∧
χn) ∈ D3(N) and (φ ∧ χ1 ∧ . . . ∧ χn, ψ) ∈ D3(N) we can adopt the CT rule to
derive (φ, ψ) ∈ D3(N).
4 Decidability
Concerning the decidability of input/output STIT logic, we study on the following prob-
lems:
– Compliance problem: given a finite set of norms N , a finite set of formulas Φ and
a formula ψ, is ψ ∈ O(N,Φ)?
– Violation problem: given a finite set of norms N , a finite set of formulas Φ and a
formula ψ, is ¬ψ ∈ O(N,Φ)?
– Compatibility problem: given a finite set of norms N , a finite set of formulas Φ and
a formula ψ, is ¬ψ 6∈ O(N,Φ)?
Intuitively, the compliance problem asks whether certain proposition complies the
normative system. The violation problem asks whether certain proposition violates the
normative system and the compatibility problem asks whether the normative system
is compatible with certain proposition. Both the violation problem and the compatibil-
ity problem can be reduced to the compliance problem, therefore we only study the
decidability of the compliance problem.
We prove that all the input/output STIT logic introduced in this paper is decidable
by showing that the compliance problem is solvable by oracle Turing machines.
Definition 6 (oracle Turing machine [3]). An oracle for a language L is a device that
is capable of reporting whether any string w is a member of L. An oracle Truing ma-
chine ML is a modified Turing machine that has the additional capability of querying
an oracle. WheneverML writes a string on a special oracle tape it is informed whether
that string is a member of L, in a single computation step.
4.1 Simple-minded
Theorem 6. The compliance problem of simple-minded input/output STIT logic is de-
cidable.
Proof: We provide the following algorithm on an oracle Turing machine with oracle
STIT-SAT = {φ ∈ L : φ is satisfiable} to solve the compliance problem of simple-
minded input/output STIT logic.
LetN = {(φ1, ψ1), . . . , (φn, ψn)}, Φ be a finite set of formulas and ψ be a formula.
1. for each φi ∈ {φ1, . . . , φn}, ask the oracle if ¬(
∧
Φ→ φi) is satisfiable.
(a) If the oracle answer “no”, then mark ψi
(b) Otherwise do nothing.
2. Let ψi1 , . . . ψik be all those ψi which are marked in step 1.
3. Ask the oracle if ¬(ψi1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψik → ψ) is satisfiable.
(a) If the oracle answer “no”, then return “accept”
(b) Otherwise return “reject”.
It can be verified that ψ ∈ Cn(N(Cn(Φ))) iff the algorithm returns “accept”.
Therefore simple-minded input/output STIT logic is decidable. a
Remark 1. Here the decidability of individual STIT logic is crucial for the decidability
of input/output STIT logic. If we choose group STIT, of which the satisfiability prob-
lem is undecidable [11], as our base logic, then our input/output STIT logic will be
undecidable because the satisfiability problem of the base logic can be reduced to the
compliance problem by making N = ∅.
Corollary 1. The violation problem and compatibility problem of simple-minded in-
put/output STIT logic is decidable.
4.2 Basic
Theorem 7. The compliance problem of basic input/output STIT logic is decidable.
Proof: We provide the following algorithm on an oracle Turing machine with oracle
STIT-SAT to solve the compliance problem.
Let N = {(φ1, ψ1), . . . , (φn, ψn)}, Φ = {χ1, . . . , χm} be a finite set of formulas
and ψ be a formula.
1. Let B1, . . . , Bm be the sequence of all minimal disjunctive extension of Φ.
2. Let i = 1.
3. Let Φ = Bi.
4. for each φj ∈ {φ1, . . . , φn}, ask the oracle if ¬(
∧
Φ→ φi) is satisfiable.
(a) If the oracle answer “no”, then mark ψj
(b) Otherwise do nothing.
5. Let ψj1 , . . . ψjk be all those ψj which are marked in step 4.
6. Ask the oracle if ¬(ψj1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψjk → ψ) is satisfiable.
(a) If the oracle answer “no”, then let i = i+ 1.
i. if i ≤ m, then goto step 3.
ii. if i = m+ 1, then return “accept”
(b) Otherwise return “reject”.
It can be verified that ψ ∈ O2(N,Φ) iff the algorithm returns “accept”. Therefore
simple-minded input/output STIT logic is decidable. a
Corollary 2. The violation problem and compatibility problem of basic input/output
STIT logic is decidable.
4.3 Simple-minded reusable
Theorem 8. The compliance problem of simple-minded reusable input/output STIT
logic is decidable.
Proof: We provide the following algorithm on an oracle Turing machine with oracle
STIT-SAT to solve the compliance problem of simple-minded reusable input/output
STIT logic. The case for simple-minded input/output STIT logic is easier and left to the
readers.
LetN = {(φ1, ψ1), . . . , (φn, ψn)}, Φ be a finite set of formulas and ψ be a formula.
1. Let X = Φ, Y = Z = N , U = ∅.
2. for each (φi, ψi) ∈ Y , ask the oracle if ¬(
∧
X → φi) is satisfiable
(a) if “no”, then let X = X ∪ {ψi}, Z = Z − {(φi, ψi)}.
(b) Otherwise do nothing.
3. If Y equals to Z, goto 4. Otherwise let Y = Z, goto step 2
4. for each (φi, ψi) ∈ N , ask the oracle if ¬(
∧
X → φi) is satisfiable
(a) If “no”, then let U = U ∪ {ψi}.
(b) Otherwise do nothing
5. Ask the oracle if ¬(∧U → ψ) is satisfiable.
(a) If “no”, then return “accept”.
(b) Otherwise return “reject”.
The correctness of the above algorithm is routine to be proven and we left it to the
readers. Therefore simple-minded reusable input/output STIT logic is decidable. a
Corollary 3. The violation problem and compatibility problem of simple-minded reusable
input/output STIT logic is decidable.
5 On Ross’ paradox
Ross’ paradox [18] originate from the logic of imperatives, and is a well-known puzzle
in deontic logic. Ross’ paradox says that the inference rule WO cannot be valid, since
if it were, then from
(1) You ought to post the letter
we could conclude that
(2) You ought to post the letter or burn it
and we obviously cannot.
Both Makinson and van der Torre’s input/output logic and deontic STIT logic [12,
13, 19] are not free from this paradox.
Ross’ paradox relies on the rule Ought(φ) → Ought(φ ∨ ψ) of deontic logic. In
our input/output STIT logic, we choose deliberative STIT as our base logic. Therefore
we don’t have |= [id]φ → [id](φ ∨ ψ) because it might be |= (φ ∨ ψ). Therefore
(>, [id](φ∨ψ)) is not derivable from (>, [id]φ), which means Ross’ paradox is solved.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we study input/output STIT logic. We introduce the semantics, proof the-
ory and prove the completeness theorem. Input/output STIT logic has stronger expres-
sive power than Mankinson and van der Torre’s input/output logic. We show that in-
put/output STIT logic is decidable and free from Ross’ paradox.
Directions of future work are manifold. Two natural directions includes: (1) What
is the semantics for basic reusable input/output STIT logic? (2) What is the complexity
of input/output STIT logic?
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